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Abstract
My paper aims to use the philosophical resources of Saint
Augustine’s thought, particularly as found in the City of
God, in order to sketch a basic worldview which can educate
and lead people towards living lives that promote sustainable
development. Specifically, I wish to show how Saint
Augustine’s concepts of order, rightly ordered love, and
temporal peace can serve as material to create a rough
metaphysical framework in which human beings are
understood to be an integrated part of a greater whole which
is the earth. The ethical corollary of this framework is that
human beings should act in such a way that does not damage
this greater whole but rather preserves its order and
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integrity. In doing this, I also hope to show that Saint
Augustine’s

thought

can

still

have

relevance

for

contemporary issues.
Keywords: sustainable development, sustainable living, Saint
Augustine, City of God, order, rightly ordered love, temporal peace

Introduction

T

he concept of “Sustainable Development” has been an
important issue ever since its definition was formulated
by the World Commission on the Environment and
Development in 1987.1 An equally important issue, however,
is the discussion on how to implement the ideas of
sustainable development in everyday life. One suggestion
regarding this is that there is a need for individuals to imbibe
a “holistic worldview” that sees human beings as an
integrated part of the universe, instead of being isolated from
it. For example, Moacir Gadotti stresses the necessity of a
“cosmic perspective” that takes into account that human
beings and their activities are ultimately connected to other
beings of the earth and the universe. 2 Gadotti claims that

1 Alan Reid, “Values in Sustainable Development,” Teaching Geography 21,
no. 4 (1996): 168, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23754452.a.
2 Moacir Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” (Brazil:
Instituto Paulo Freire, 2004), 25, last modified 2016, http://earthcharter.org/
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such a perspective can lead to the adoption of lifestyles that
can preserve the well-being of both humanity and the
natural environment since people will become more
sensitive precisely to the fact that they are an integrated part
of a whole which they should respect and not damage.
In this paper, I wish to contribute to Gadotti’s idea by
suggesting a possible resource for a holistic worldview that
can, in turn, promote a way of life conducive to sustainable
development. More precisely, I wish to utilize the philosophy
of Saint Augustine of Hippo, particularly as it is found in the
City of God, to make a rough sketch of a metaphysical and
ethical framework for living sustainably. I believe that there
are three connected concepts in Augustine’s philosophy
which can serve as material for this framework. One is
Augustine’s concept of order, while the other two are
corollaries of these, namely, rightly ordered love and temporal
peace.
My paper will then proceed as follows: I will begin by
discussing the definition of sustainable development and how
it is a debated concept because of the different understandings
that people have of it. I will then put forward Gadotti’s
opinion that these different understandings stem from a lack
of a holistic view of the world. I will then briefly discuss the
claim of Gadotti and other scholars that this holistic view

virtual-library2/education-for-sustainable-development-what-we-need-to-learnto-save-the-planet-2004/.
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along with its corollary, ethical values, is necessary for
sustainable living and thus what is also primarily necessary for
sustainable development. After this, I will propose that the
aforesaid philosophy of Augustine can serve as a resource for
this holistic worldview. Before further exploring Augustine’s
philosophy, I shall answer certain objections to applying his
thought to the contemporary endeavor of sustainable
development. After this, I shall elaborate the three aforesaid
concepts of order, rightly ordered love, and temporal peace.
In the penultimate section, I will attempt to utilize these
concepts in order to provide a basic sketch of a holistic
worldview for sustainable living. I will then end with a brief
concluding remark.
Sustainable Development and the Need
for a Worldview for Sustainability
The World Commission on Environment and
Development, also called the Bruntdland Commission, defines
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.” 3 This is a noticeably
loose formulation, as it defines neither what needs to be
sustained, nor what “development” actually means.4 According
to Annick Hedlund-de Witt, the formulation was made in
3

Reid, “Values in Sustainable Development,” 168.
Annick Hedlund-de Witt, “Rethinking Sustainable Development:
Considering How Different Worldviews Envision ‘Development’ and
‘Quality of Life,’” Sustainability 6. (2014): 8312, doi: 10.3390/su6118310.
4
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order to accommodate the multiple meanings that people
might attach to the concept, and so as to precisely foster
cooperation among these peoples who might have different
convictions.5 However, as broad as it might seem, sustainable
development is not a totally vacuous concept. For Witt,
sustainable development is essentially the attempt to
combine economic growth with the conservation of the
environment.6 He says that one of the insights expressed by
the Bruntdland Commission is that economic and ecological
well-being go hand-in-hand. Economies cannot hope to
flourish if the methods that they use for growth are
environmentally destructive with the environment itself as
their main resource. Ultimately, the human race itself cannot
preserve its own existence if its economies drain the natural
resources of the planet in a much faster rate than the
renewing of these resources. Sustainable development
therefore seeks to support “human progress not just in a
few pieces or years, but for the entire planet into the distant
future.”7
Despite this, sustainable development still remains a
hotly contested concept.8 Some have interpreted sustainable
development to primarily mean preserving the well-being of
5

Hedlund-de Witt, “Rethinking Sustainable Development,” 8312.
Ibid., 8313.
7 Ibid., 8314.
8 Sophia Imran, Korshed Alam and Narelle Beaumont, “Reinterpreting the
Definition of Sustainable Development for a More Ecocentric Reorientation,”
Sustainable Development 22. (2014): 135, doi: 10.1002/sd.537.
6
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the ecosystem.9 Others understand sustainable development as
chiefly pertaining to human beings, and that stewardship of the
environment is just a means to achieve this goal. 10 These
ecocentric and anthropocentric conceptions, respectively,
assume a dualism between nature and humanity which,
however, need not be assumed. Indeed, it is this dualistic
view which certain educators of sustainable development
believe to be a part of the problem. Gadotti, for instance,
stresses the fact that social and environmental problems
should not be treated separately because they are ultimately
connected. He considers the dualistic perspective as a lack of a
holistic worldview, which sees all things as interconnected.11 It
is this holistic view in turn which Gadotti believes necessary
for sustainable development.
Moreover, this holistic worldview should be lived out in
practice. Gadotti believes that what is of primary importance
in promoting sustainable development is that people adapt
lifestyles that are sustainable and not wasteful of the planet’s
resources. This requires that the emotional, rational, and
intuitive capacities of people should be educated to care
more for the earth. 12 Likewise, values that have concrete
behavioral effects such as simplicity, austerity, and concern

9

Imran, et al., “Reinterpreting,” 136.
Ibid.
11 Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” 8.
12 Ibid., 22.
10
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for others, should be promoted by such an education.13 It is
when people live sustainably, then, that sustainable development
can become widespread, since a predominantly sustainable
society can only come to be if the values of sustainability are
already lived out by each of its members. 14 This is also the
opinion of other scholars such as Jesse and Eric Pappas, who
envision “sustainable individuals” as the key or “foundation for
action in social, economic, and environmental sustainability.”15
Pappas defines such individuals as follows:
Sustainable individuals are characterized by
creating harmony, interconnection, and relatively
high levels of self-awareness in their values,
thoughts, behaviors, and actions as well as
cultivating continued individual growth in their
physical, emotional, social, philosophical, and
intellectual abilities. Individual sustainability
includes possessing a well-developed and
demonstrated value system that acknowledges
the importance and interconnectedness of all
global biological and social systems, and our
appropriate place within them.16

13

Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” 22.
Ibid., 21.
15 Jesse Pappas and Eric Pappas, “The Sustainable Personality, Values and
Behaviors in Individual Sustainability,” International Journal of Higher Education 4,
no.1 (2015): 12, doi: 10.5430/ijhe.v4n1p12.
16 Ibid.
14
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That sustainable individuals should have a “value system”
that recognizes the interconnectedness of global systems
resonates with Gadotti’s belief that people interested in
living sustainably should adopt a new paradigm. Gadotti
calls this the Earth’s paradigm and its chief purpose is to
inform people that their “common destiny in the planet is to
share life in the planet with others.” 17 People should be
taught not to view the world as a compartmentalized
thing, “composed [of] separate parts or bodies.”18 Rather,
the universe is a “sacred and mysterious whole” in which
what happens to one part resonates with the entirety.19
Scholars such as Gadotti and Pappas believe that what is
necessary for sustainable development is an alteration of
behavior on the part of individuals. A person must begin to
live in such a way that her actions become beneficial and not
harmful to the world around her. Her life must manifest an
efficient use of natural resources so that she does not
deprive her fellow human beings, whether present or future,
of the natural resources that they would need for their own
well-being. This change of attitude in turn should go handin-hand with, and indeed be a corollary of, a holistic
understanding of the universe—one which sees humanity
and the rest of creation as parts of an ordered whole.

17

Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” 22.
Ibid., 23.
19 Ibid.
18
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Augustine’s Philosophy and Sustainable Development
Objections
As said above, I believe that the philosophy of Saint
Augustine can serve as material from which to draw this
holistic understanding of the world, along with its ethical
corollaries. Now, Augustine’s philosophy might initially
seem to be a strange choice for this purpose, as I foresee
three objections with regards to using his philosophy for this
contemporary issue of sustainable development. The first is
that Augustine’s philosophy gives too much emphasis on the
individual’s relationship with God, while giving little
relevance to the world. The second is that it promotes
authoritarianism, which, in turn, is no longer acceptable to
the sensibilities of our contemporary world. The third
objection has to do with the role of grace in Augustine’s
thought. Augustine considers God’s grace as an
indispensable element of any human attempt to achieve
goodness. This seems to be difficult, even impossible, to
integrate in a paradigm of sustainable development, where
there is no necessary place for something like Augustine’s
Christian God. I will answer these objections below,
although I do not claim that these answers will definitively
solve the difficulties of using Augustine’s philosophy for
sustainable development. At best, I hope that my answers
make it less improbable for Augustine’s thought to be
appropriated for living sustainably. By giving these answers, I
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hope to provide a context for my interpretation of Augustine’s
thought and its relation with other interpretations.
Let me then address the first objection. There is an
understanding of Augustine that views his philosophy as too
focused on one’s relationship with God, to the point of
ignoring the world. This is represented for example by
Gordon Kaufman’s opinion of Augustine in his article,
“Ecological Consciousness and the symbol ‘God’.” For
Kaufman, Augustine gives main interest only to “God and
the soul,” while the other beings of creation, with the
exception of angels, have mostly been left out in serious
theological discussions.20 Uta Ranke-Heinemann also accuses
Augustine of having an “urge to break away from everything
earthly and beloved on this earth” and of ultimately having
recourse to an “escapist version of Christianity,” due to
him being influenced by ascetic Neo-Platonism. 21 Indeed,
Augustine himself seems to vindicate these opinions. After
all, it is he who said in his Soliloquies that he desires to know
only God and the soul and nothing more.22 Also, in the City
of God, Augustine often expresses his dismal view of earthly
life with all its hardships, in contrast to the happiness of
eternal life in heaven. He also demolishes the belief of the

20

Gordon D. Kaufman, “Ecological Consciousness and the Symbol ‘God,’”
Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000): 6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1390316.
21 Both quotations cited are from: Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the
Kingdom (New York: Doubleday), 81.
22 Soliloquia, 1.4. I have used the translation by Robert P. Russel (2008).
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philosophers that happiness can be had in earthly life, by
enumerating the many miseries that plague man both on the
individual and societal levels.23 Some of these miseries are
disease, death, misunderstanding, and injustice, which
Augustine believes will always harass humans while they live
in this world.
However, as Arthur Ledoux says, there is more to
Augustine’s apparent contemptus mundi than meets the eye.
For Ledoux, this focusing of Augustine on God and the self
is not a way of escaping the world. Rather, it is the initial
step in transforming one’s self to be able to transcend one’s
own limitations due to sin, and be able to see and act upon
the world in accordance with God’s will.24 For Augustine,
union with God is the ultimate goal that human beings
should strive for. However, Augustine believes that
humanity’s sinfulness prevents them from achieving this.
Thus, a person would need to distance herself from her own
selfishness as well as the attractions of the world that
accentuate such selfishness, in order to be united with God.
His proclamations about the misery of earthly life, therefore,
is for the purpose of leading the readers’ mind toward
contemplating the absolute happiness one can attain
through union with God, against which happiness in this
23 De civ. Dei 19.4–10. Unless otherwise noted, I have used the abridged
version of the translation by Gerald G. Walsh et al. (1958) in all citations.
24 Arthur Ledoux, “A Green Augustine: On Learning to Love Nature Well,”
Theology and Science 3, no. 3 (2005): 333–334, doi: 10.1080/14746700500317313.
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world pales in comparison.25 Instilling a certain devaluation
for earthly life is a required step for desiring and achieving
this union. Despite this, Augustine strongly believed that all
creation is naturally good, being a manifestation of God’s
own goodness and wisdom.26
We can better see Augustine’s appreciation for creation
by looking at his answers against his theological rivals,
namely, the Manichees. The Manichees affirmed, unlike
Christianity, that there were two eternal principles
responsible for all things, one principle being good and the
other evil. 27 The principle of good was attacked by the
principle of evil in the beginning of time. This resulted in
“portions” of the principle of good being trapped within
bodies, which in turn are of the principle of evil. For the
human being, this meant that her soul, which is of the
principle of good, is caged in her evil body. Salvation then
consisted of freeing the soul from the body and its carnal
urges so that the soul may be reunited with the principle of
good. The Manichees thus considered the physical world of
bodies as evil and something to be transcended. Consequently,
the Manichees attacked the Christian doctrine that the universe

25

George Lawless, “Augustine’s Decentering of Asceticism,” in Augustine
and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert Dodaro and George
Lawless (New York: Routledge, 2000), 142.
26 De civ. Dei, 11.21.
27 Ronald J. Teske, Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and On the
Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, vol. 84 in The Fathers of the
Church (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 8.
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is ultimately good because of having been made by a good
God. The Manichees’ objection to the Christian position
may be summed up in two questions. One is that, if the
Christian position is true, then what accounts for the
existence of evil? The second is that if the Christians are
right, then why do there seem to be useless creatures?
Augustine’s reply to the first question is that evil is not a
positive reality, but merely a privation, or lack of such a
reality. Therefore, God cannot create evil, nor can evil be a
principle equal with God. For instance, in his work, On
Genesis Against the Manichees, Augustine ridicules the
Manichees for thinking that the “darkness,” from which
God separated the light in Genesis, signifies actual entities
competing with God, since the darkness is not said to be
created by God. 28 Augustine says that the darkness simply
signifies the lack of light before God created such light, and
that the darkness is not a “something” that existed even
before creation. Thus, it would be silly to think that this
darkness contended with God, just as it is silly to think that
silence literally fought against sound, or that nakedness
fought against being clothed.29 The other side of this denial
of the substantiality of evil would be Augustine’s affirmation
of the natural goodness of all things. All natures, as he says,
are good insofar as they exist because God made them to be
28 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1.4.7. I have used the translation of Ronald J.
Teske (1991) in all citations.
29 Ibid.
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good and because of this the whole universe “is filled with
every kind of good.”30
However, Augustine does not deny the reality of evil. In
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, Augustine affirms that
evil indeed exists, though it is not found in the nature of
things. On the contrary, “evil is either sin or the punishment
of sin. Sin is nothing but the evil assent of free will, when we
incline to those things which justice forbids and from which
we are free to abstain. [Sin] does not lie in the things
themselves, but in their illegitimate use.”31 Evil occurs when
human beings desire and use things in a way that is
contradictory with God’s ordained order for the universe.
More will be said of this later in discussing rightly ordered
love. As for the “punishment of sin,” Augustine means by
this the fact that human beings are susceptible to death and
all the bodily frailties that we know of today, in contrast to
their original state before the fall. Consequently, certain
beings, which previously could not harm man, such as
ferocious animals, poisonous plants, and harsh elements
have become dangerous and even fatal to him. Still, these
beings are not intrinsically evil, because God created them
with good natures.
When it comes to the Manichees’ second objection which
is that there seems to be creatures that are not good in the
30

De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 2.29.
De Genesi ad litteram, 1.3. I have used the translation of Ronald J. Teske
(1991).
31
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sense of being useless, Augustine’s reply is that these
creatures only seem superfluous because humans have a
limited view of the world and thus do not appreciate how
each being contributes to the greater scheme of things. For
Augustine, each individual thing contributes to the beauty of
the whole universe. He gives a number of analogies to
convey this idea32 and one is the human body. Certain parts
of the human body may not be attractive, or as attractive, if
considered in isolation. And yet if considered in terms of
how they contribute to the beauty and unity of the entire
body, then they will be better appreciated. Another analogy
is that of a beautiful speech. The individual letter and
syllables of such a speech are likely not as splendid as the
speech itself. Indeed, they would be senseless if considered
by themselves and not in unity with each other. The error of
the Manichees, then, is that they focus only on the isolated
creature and not its relation to the universe, when judging its
worth. Furthermore, they judge the goodness of a creature
based on its utility to human beings.33 But to do so betrays a
very limited and anthropocentric kind of view, in which the
value of everything is relative only to humans.
From these answers to the Manichees, we can see how
Augustine indeed acknowledged and appreciated creation’s
value. The world, for him, was not something intrinsically

32
33

De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1.21.32.
Ibid., 1.16.26–27.
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evil that had to be transcended. Rather, the universe and its
beauty were a manifestation of God’s benevolence. As such,
all things, whether taken individually or taken together, are
of their nature good. It is only due to the sinful wills of
rational creatures, such as humans and angels, that evil was
introduced into the world. One last thing to note is that we
can see, from Augustine’s metaphor of the body, that his
understanding of the universe does appear to resonate with
Gadotti’s holistic view of the world. For both Gadotti and
Augustine, the universe is a whole which consists of the
harmonious connection of its parts. Furthermore, this whole
should be treated with respect by man. For Gadotti, the
reason for this is because the universe is “sacred” while for
Augustine the reason is that the universe is a manifestation
of God’s goodness. Finally, similar to Gadotti, Augustine
believes that what happens to one part of this whole affects
the whole itself. This can be seen when the latter says that if
ever the body loses one of its parts, then the lost part,
together with the other parts that still form the body,
become ugly.34
Let me go then to the second objection: Augustine’s
philosophy promotes authoritarianism. I admit that there is
a way of understanding Augustine’s political thought that
leads to authoritarianism. This is especially true when one
considers that elements in Augustine’s works themselves
34

De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1.21.32.
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appear to promote authoritarianism. For example, in the City
of God, Augustine insists that the ideal Christian citizen
should leave the governing of society to the people in
authority, and that these Christians should not resist the
abuses that they might experience from authority, unless
such abuses prevent one from living out the Christian
faith. 35 This is because the people in authority, whether
secular or ecclesiastical, are chosen by God and it is the duty
of Christians to accept their rule. The abuses of such
authority should be accepted by the faithful with pious
perseverance—these abuses being considered as means given
by God for the faithful’s increase in virtue. Another example
in Augustine’s thought that encourages authoritarianism is his
belief in physically coercing people into believing a certain
creed. This can be seen in Augustine’s dealing with the
Donatists. After experiencing the violence that the Donatists
afflicted on his fellow Catholics, and also after witnessing
how certain Donatists that were forced to convert to
Catholicism actually came to embrace that latter faith,
Augustine became convinced that the state’s use of physical
coercion against these aforesaid Donatists was warranted. 36
Putting these two examples together, it seems that
Augustine’s philosophy would condone the idea that people

35

Alan Ryan, On Politics (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 180.
E.M. Atkins and Robert Dodaro, eds., Augustine: Political Writings
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxiii–xxiv.
36
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with institutional authority have the absolute right to impose
the beliefs that they favor on those under their jurisdiction.
However, there are alternative ways of interpreting
Augustine’s thought that do not result in promoting
authoritarianism. Examples of these are what Hoon Woo
lists as two modern appropriations of Augustine’s political
philosophy. The first is what Woo calls “soft realism.” Soft
realism accepts Augustine’s view that state authority is
indeed God-given, however it is “regarded as limited in [it’s]
ability to achieve [it’s] moral ends and necessarily tolerant of
diverse customs.”37 Though Woo does not explain further,
what I think soft realism capitalizes on is Augustine’s belief
that there can ultimately be no perfect society on earth, due
to all human beings having a sinful nature. From this, it can
be argued that the over-zealous desire of authorities to
coercively impose upon others what to their mind is the
right way of life may betray an inordinate desire to establish
a perfect society here on earth, which is precisely what
Augustine goes against. Those in authority should be wary
of coercively imposing their beliefs on others, for such an
intention may stem more from the sinful desire to dominate
others, instead of a genuinely good desire of reforming
them.

37 B. Hoon Woo, “Pilgrim’s Progress in Society: Augustine’s Political Thought
in The City of God,” Political Theology 16, no. 5 (2015): 427, doi:10.1179/
1462317X14Z.000000000113.
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Aside from soft-realism, Woo identifies a “confessional”
appropriation of Augustine’s philosophy.38 This emphasizes
the sinful nature of human beings in Augustine’s thought. It
does not recommend any action on the part of institutions
or people in authority, nor does it focus on purposely
changing society at the macro-level. Rather, in this approach,
the Christian prioritizes the overcoming of her own sinful
condition which Woo calls the “‘monstrosity’ of [one’s] own
divided will.” 39 In a confessional approach, what is given
importance is the personal transformation of a human being
from her state of sinfulness into union with God. This
approach also considers the condition of larger society as
simply symptomatic of the sinful or non-sinful condition of
each individual. Thus, the confessional approach does not
completely ignore the world beyond the individual, although
it does not focus on directly using the institutions of larger
society. It is this confessional approach then which seems to
be the least authoritarian interpretation of Augustine since it
focuses more on personal transformation than institutional
change. It is also for this reason that I think this approach
squares most with the way that I wish to use Augustine’s
philosophy for sustainable living. The confessional
approach’s focus on individual transformation resonates
with Gadotti’s idea of changing one’s personal values and

38
39

Hoon Woo, “Pilgrim’s Progress”, 428.
Ibid.
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attitudes in order to live sustainably. The implicit argument
of the confessional approach, namely, that it is through
one’s rectifying of one’s self that society can also be
rectified, parallels Gadotti and Pappass’ idea that sustainable
development can only truly come about if there is a change
of values in the individual level. In light of this, I shall also
consider my appropriation of Augustine’s philosophy as a
variant of the confessional approach, which aims to use
Augustine’s thought to bring about positive personal
transformation.
Finally, let me proceed to the third objection which is the
problem of how a crucial element in Augustine’s philosophy,
namely “grace,” can be integrated in a contemporary
framework for sustainable living. It is well known that
Augustine stresses the necessity of grace for man to achieve
anything truly good. This implies the well-known dichotomy
between man’s “natural capacity” and God’s “supernatural
grace,” the former being unable to achieve true goodness
without being supported by the latter. Of course, the
difficulty of applying this idea to a non-theological
worldview of sustainability is that there is no God to grant
grace. It would seem then that judged from an
“Augustinian” lens, all the efforts at character improvement
that the aforesaid worldview would promote will ultimately
be in vain, since such a natural effort will not be suffused by
supernatural grace. A further difficulty is that even if
somehow supernatural grace were to be incorporated in the
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aforesaid worldview, Augustine believes that only a limited
number of human beings actually receive this grace.40 From
these considerations, it must be admitted that it is simply not
possible to reconcile Augustine’s original views about grace
with the above-mentioned worldview.
Nevertheless, I do believe that a qualified notion of grace
can still be incorporated in a contemporary worldview for
sustainability. But why even attempt such incorporation? My
answer is that the notion of grace can engender in people a
sense of gratitude for all the good things that they have
received. This in turn can serve as an impetus for sustainable
living. I will discuss more of this later.
A modified understanding of grace can be integrated in a
worldview for sustainability. In Augustine’s thought, grace
may be understood in two ways, and this is what Eugene
Teselle calls the notion of “double gratuity” in Augustine’s
works. 41 The first gratuity is the actual existence of a
creature, while the second gratuity is the grace that God
gives to the creature so that it can achieve its perfection. For
instance, in the Confessions, Augustine says that not only is
the everlasting experience of the beatific vision by the good
angels a grace from God, but the very capacity of these

40

De civ. Dei, 21.12. For an English translation, it is advised to see the
translation of Marcus Dods (1887) since the translation of Walsh et al. does
not contain the cited book and chapter.
41 Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of Genesis
I, 1-5,” Recherches Augustiniennes 5 (1968): 97.
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angels for the vision, that is to say their existence, is also
itself a grace.42
I believe that grace in this sense of “first gratuity” is what
can be better adopted for a worldview of sustainability. This
is because grace as “first gratuity” is not Divine favor given
only to a particular group of beings. Rather, this first gratuity
extends to all beings insofar as they exist. It may be objected
though that this grace would still require a God who gives it.
However, contemporary conceptions of grace show that this
need not be the case. For example, John Caputo considers
as grace the very wonder that is our existence—something
which we did not ask for, but received nonetheless, like a
gift.43 He does not exclude the possibility of a God giving
this grace to us, but he also does not consider it necessary.
To illustrate this, Caputo uses an example from Friedrich
Nietzsche. In his essay, “On Truth and Lies in the
Nonmoral Sense,” Nietzsche begins with this short
anecdote:
Once upon a time, in some out of the way
corner of the universe which is dispersed into
numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a
star upon which clever beasts invented knowing.
That was the most arrogant and mendacious
42 Confessionum, 13.1. I have used the translation by John K. Ryan (1960) in
all citations.
43 John Caputo, Truth: Philosophy in Transit (London: Penguin Books, 2013),
259–260.
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minute of ‘world history,’ but nevertheless, it was
only a minute. After nature had drawn a few
breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the
clever beasts had to die.44
The implication of this story is that humans are but
insignificant and fleeting specks in the universe, and that it is
conceited of them to think that they are something more,
particularly in the sense of them being able to know the true
knowledge of things. However, Caputo suggests an
alternative to Nietzsche’s trivializing view. For Caputo, the
fact that, for a moment in the universe’s life, there was a
place in it where creatures fortuitously arose capable of
thought and language—a place where the universe could
“know itself” as it were—should be considered a thing of
wonder, and indeed, of gratitude.45 It is both this “cosmic
luck” that brought us to existence, as well as the very
wonder of our existence as creatures aware of the universe,
which Caputo believes can be considered as a grace given to
us, regardless of whether there is a divine giver of this grace
or not.
This idea of grace as existence itself also leads us beyond
the dichotomy of “natural” human effort and “supernatural”
grace mentioned above. If grace is the very gift of our being,
then this means that grace is already “natural.” In other
44
45

Caputo, Philosophy in Transit, 193–4.
Ibid., 258–60.
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words, grace is that which is already given to human beings
at the very start, and whatever striving for goodness they
carry out is only possible due to this grace, and is only a
response to this grace. In the context of living sustainably,
grace need not be considered as supernatural aid which is
necessary to ensure the perfection of one’s actions. Rather,
grace can be considered as the very “givenness” of one’s
existence. The effort to live sustainably can be understood
as a response to this grace, similar to how Augustine
believed that his striving for union with God was already a
response to the initial graces of being created and converted
by Him. 46 This leads to what I said above about how the
notion of grace can promote an attitude of gratitude. If
indeed human beings have received life from the universe
without them even asking for it, then it seems that the
primary disposition that human beings should have in
relation to the universe is one of gratitude. Again, this
attitude does not need to be directed at a specific deity or
personality, although there is nothing that prevents this
either. It can be directed to the natural world that continues
to nourish humankind and also to the human world to
which all human beings owe their cultural and social
identities. In any case, having this “virtue” of gratitude can
serve as an impetus for people to live sustainably, leading
them to realize that they have received so much from the
46
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world. In return, they respond to the world’s generosity by
being responsible in their use of the its resources—although
it is likely that they can never fully repay their “debt.”
Augustine’s Potential Contribution to the Idea of Sustainable Development
Now that I have addressed the objections, I would like to
show how ideas from Augustine’s philosophy can enhance
the concept of sustainable development in such a manner
that address the issues alluded by Gadotti above. I provide
two ways: One is that Augustine’s conception of a
hierarchical universe, which shows that things have unequal
ontological value but are nevertheless all intrinsically good,
can help strike a balance between the two extreme
interpretations of sustainable development, namely, that of
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. The second has to do
with the focus of Augustine’s philosophy on love as the
primary force that directs and molds human beings. For
Augustine, the loves that people have determine their
character, and ultimately, their effects on the world. Indeed,
so fundamental is love that in the City of God, Augustine
divides the entire human race based on the two basic, but
opposing, loves, namely, love of God over self and love of
self over God.47 I believe that this focus on a person’s loves
resonates with Gadotti and Pappas’ emphasis on the
importance of a person’s values in promoting sustainable
47
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development. In other words, sustainable development can
only come about if the values or loves of human beings are
ordered towards achieving sustainability. Again, more of this
will be expounded in the succeeding section, where I further
explain Augustine’s ideas in the City of God.
Order, Ordered Love, and Temporal Peace
in Augustine’s City of God
I believe that there are three distinguishable, but
intertwined, concepts in Augustine’s City of God that, given
some modifications, can serve as material for a basic
worldview for living sustainably. The first is the concept of
“order,” which Augustine believes presides, or should
preside, over all of creation. The second is the concept of
ordo amoris, or rightly ordered love. For Augustine, human
beings should nourish love for things that correspond to the
cosmic order just mentioned. The third concept is “temporal
peace,” which, for, Augustine is the end of a strictly earthly
life. In the remainder of this section, I will elaborate on
these three concepts, and in the last section (An
Augustinian-Inspired Worldview for Sustainable Living) I
will suggest how they can be modified to serve as material
for a worldview of sustainable living.
On Order
Let me begin then with the concept of order, which
Augustine defines as “an arrangement of like and unlike
things whereby each of them is disposed in its proper
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place.” 48 For Augustine, order encompasses the whole of
creation and this order is manifested in the fact that all
creatures are part of a hierarchy in which they have varying
degrees of value. In the City of God, Augustine describes this
hierarchy as follows:49
Among all things which somehow exist and
which can be distinguished from God who made
them, those that live are ranked higher than
those that do not . . . [among] living things, the
sentient are superior to the non-sentient, for
example, animals to trees. Among sentient
beings, the intelligent are higher than the nonintelligent, as with men and cattle. Among the
intelligent, the immortal are superior to the
mortal, as angels to men.
Now it might seem that, by establishing gradation, and
therefore inequality, among beings, Augustine is in danger of
reducing the worth of certain beings, particularly those in
the “lower tiers” of the hierarchy. However, if one looks at
the context of Augustine’s overall thought, one will see that
the purpose of this hierarchy is not to degrade the worth of
beings but to affirm their goodness. As was said above,
Augustine believed in the natural goodness of all creatures.
Aside from this, he also believed that creatures have value,
48
49
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insofar as they contribute to the beauty of the universe. But,
as was also mentioned above, creatures contribute to the
overall beauty of the universe not by being all equally
beautiful in the same respect. Rather, it is precisely by being
different from each other, and yet still acting in harmony
with each other, that creatures are able to make up the
beautiful whole that is the universe—just like how the
different parts of the human body are not uniformly alike,
and yet by their very non-uniformity form the elegant whole
which is the body. With regards to the beauty of the
universe therefore, even the most insignificant, unseemly,
and even harmful creature is a necessary contributor to it.
Augustine’s idea of a hierarchy, then, far from being an
instrument for the devaluation of creatures, is meant to
convey the inherent worth that all creatures have as being
part of a beautiful universe, which in turn is the
manifestation of God’s wisdom. The idea of the hierarchy
also gives a sense of interconnection among all creatures
since it implies that every creature ultimately has a place in
the greater scheme of things. And as said above, this
concept of hierarchy can strike a balance between the
extremes of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. On the one
hand, Augustine believes that human beings are at the top of
this hierarchy of earthly creatures, and that means that
human beings can legitimately use and consume animals and
plants for their own benefit. Simultaneously, precisely by
being part of this hierarchy of beings created by God,
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animals and plants also have intrinsic goodness apart from
the utility that human beings see in them. Therefore, it
would also be an evil if human beings destroy animals and
plants to the point of extinction. This would mar the
beautiful order made by God, similar to what Augustine said
above of how a body in losing its parts would be deprived of
its beauty. Moreover, wantonly destroying non-human living
beings would, as also mentioned above, betray a very
narrow, anthropocentric view of the world. Finally, the
desire of humans to annihilate entire species of animals
simply because they are an inconvenience is, Augustine
believes, likely brought about by passion instead of reason,
which in turn is a deviation from rightly ordered love.50 To
this idea we turn to next.
On Rightly Ordered Love
According to Francisco Benzoni, Augustine understands
love in two ways. Love can be understood as a tendency
toward an object (desire) and the rest that results from
attaining the object (joy).51 Understood this way, these two
senses of love are just two distinct parts of the process of
loving. For Augustine, this process of loving and the order
of the universe are closely connected. This is because the
50
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aforesaid order consists of the things of the universe tending
towards their proper places, if not already resting in it. Thus,
Augustine at times use the word love analogically to describe
the movement of all kinds of beings toward their proper
“niche” within the greater scheme of things. For example, in
the City of God, Augustine says that animals love the “carnal
life of the senses” which is their “sufficient good,” and that
once they obtain this they would “seek nothing further.”52
Likewise, Augustine says that trees, although not having
any consciousness, tend toward fruitfulness.53 Finally, even
lifeless things like “waves, winds or flames,” tend toward
their proper places due to the gravity of their bodies.54 For
example, flames would go up because of their lightness,
while water would go down because of its weight.
In following their proper “loves,” therefore, all things
contribute to the order of the universe. Humans are no
different, and their capacity for intellect and free will allow
them to love in the full sense of choosing and desiring a
good that is consciously apprehended. Now, Augustine
believes that the primary good that man should tend
towards is none other than God, the supreme good.
However, since human beings have free will, they do not
automatically tend towards their proper object of love like
other earthly creatures do. Moreover, human beings often
52
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do not love God in the manner that they should, mainly due
to the effect of original sin. According to Augustine, the first
sin of Adam and Eve had two disastrous effects on the rest
of the human race. 55 One is ignorance, or the lack of the
intimate knowledge of God that the first couple enjoyed in
the Garden of Eden. The second is the difficulty of human
reason to control the baser appetites, leading humans to lust
over created things. These two effects can be summed into
only one: that human beings no longer love God above all
things, but instead tend to love themselves most of all.
This disordered love in turn harms the order that exists in
human beings themselves and the rest of creation. This
disordered love disrupts the order of the human being
because, as mentioned, it results in the loss of reason’s
power over the passions or lower appetites. But, aside from
inflicting harm on the order of the human’s soul, inordinate
desire can also injure the order of the human body. It is a
common notion, after all, that things often hurt people
when acquired and used excessively. Augustine gives the
example of food and drink, which although are necessary for
the physical well-being of humans, can nevertheless harm
them when taken immoderately.56 Finally, besides inflicting
damage to the order of their own selves, humans also
55 William E. Mann, “Augustine on evil and original sin,” in Cambridge
Companion to Augustine, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 47.
56 De civ. Dei, 11.22.
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damage the order of the external world because of their
immoderate desires. This is what Augustine means when he
says that the desire of human beings to extinguish species of
animals is due more to their passions than their reason. That
is to say, it is due to the irrational drive to convenience
themselves that human beings are led to the extreme of
wishing, and indeed acting out, the extinction of entire
species.
It is because of these undesirable consequences of
inordinate love that the idea of rightly ordered love becomes
vital. To clarify, for Augustine, loving God above all things
does not mean that one should not love creatures. Rather, it
means that love of creatures should never be in the same
degree of love for God. More specifically, a person should
love creatures ultimately out of love for God, so that one’s
love for creatures must always be such that it aligns with
one’s love for God. Thus, one should not commit sin
against God for the sake of loving a creature. For example,
my love for my friend does not mean that I cooperate with
him in murder. Similarly, my love for food should not lead
me to gluttony. In other words, rightly ordered love entails
that in all my relationships with creatures, I should take care
not to damage the most important relationship which is that
between God and me. And indeed, it is precisely by
preserving my primary relationship with God that I also
ensure that the relationships I have with other creatures are
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correct, and that, consequently, I do not disturb the order of
the world through inordinate desires.
Now I believe that Augustine’s philosophy of rightly
ordered love can play a significant role in a worldview for
sustainability, because it shows a way of remedying the
disordered attachments to things that people have, which
often lead to excessive material consumption and
unsustainable living. As Benzoni says, in our increasingly
materialistic culture, people often define themselves in terms
of material possessions.57 The solution for this, then, is that
people should learn to love material goods in a non-absolute
way, just as how Augustine’s rightly ordered love entails
loving creatures non-absolutely. This means that material
goods are not supposed to be the ultimate object of love
but, rather, they are supposed to be objects of love that are
subordinated and referred to a higher principle. For
Augustine, this higher principle, is of course God, and his
philosophy of rightly ordered love would never allow it to
be otherwise. Hence, similar to Augustine’s idea of grace, I
do not think that Augustine’s original philosophy of ordo
amoris can be integrated in a contemporary worldview for
sustainability.
However, I believe that there is still a possibility to
reconcile Augustine’s philosophy of rightly ordered love

57 Benzoni, “Augustinian Understanding of Love,” http://www.quodlibet.net/
articles/benzoni-love.shtml.
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with the goal of sustainability. This is because Augustine
does provide another principle or object of love that,
although subordinate to God, is still something he considers
most important for earthly life. Moreover, this object can be
made as a goal by a person, whether or not she believes in
something like Augustine’s God. This object is what he calls
“temporal peace.”
On Temporal Peace
To explain what temporal peace is, it would be good to
first explore Augustine’s understanding of peace itself. In
the City of God, Augustine defines peace as “the calm that
comes from order.”58 This means that peace is what results
when the order in the universe is realized, which in turn
occurs when things move towards and finally rest in their
proper places. Analogically, peace can refer to the purposes
or ends of these very movements. For example, when it
comes to living things such as animals, Augustine says that
self-preservation and propagation of their species is their
peace.59 With regards to human beings, Augustine believes
that their ultimate peace is eternal life with God. However,
although Augustine acknowledges that life in heaven is
where man will achieve his true peace, he also admits that in
this mortal life there is a kind of peace that is still worth

58
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striving for, namely, the peace of human societies on earth.60
This “temporal peace” consists of an “ordered harmony of
authority and obedience between citizens”61 through which
these citizens attain for themselves the material goods
necessary for mortal existence.62 These goods include those
needed for the preservation of “health, security, and human
fellowship” such as “air to breath, water to drink, everything
that goes to feed, clothe, cure, and beautify the body.” 63
From this definition, it can easily be understood why
Augustine thinks that those who have God as their highest
goal should still exert effort in promoting this temporal
peace. This is because having the necessary amount of
material goods for physical living is a general condition for
being able to live virtuously.
Temporal peace then is the fulfillment of a “purely
human life”—a life which does not take into account the
supernatural and highest end of man, which is eternal life
with God.64 Although Augustine does not believe that this
earthly peace is man’s highest good, he considers it of
enough significance that he expects both the people who
have a rightly ordered love and those who have a disordered
love, to work together in establishing it. As he says in the
60
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City of God, “For as mortal life is the same for all, there
ought to be common cause between the two cities [that is to
say between the people who have rightly ordered love and
disordered love] in what concerns our purely human
living.”65 This idea that temporal peace is such a significant
goal that even people aiming for different ultimate ends
should work together to achieve it, is something which I
believe can make temporal peace an appropriate goal of a
worldview for sustainable living. This I will explore in the
next section below where I shall attempt to utilize the
concepts of Augustine that I have discussed to draw a rough
sketch of, precisely, this aforesaid worldview.
An Augustinian-Inspired Worldview for Sustainable Living
To begin this application of Augustine’s philosophy to a
worldview of sustainable living, I would first like to expand
the scope of temporal peace from Augustine’s original
interpretation. If temporal peace should be the aim of
sustainable living and development, then this peace should
be enlarged to include the world beyond human civilization,
namely, that of nature and the environment. Specifically, I
suggest that the scope of temporal peace should encompass
the biosphere of the earth itself. In any case, this
modification is pretty much in line with Augustine’s
thought. If peace for Augustine is the state where all things
65
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rest in their proper niche in the universe, it would indeed
seem appropriate if temporal peace includes not merely
human civilization but the natural world beyond it. Also, if
Augustine believes that the universe is a whole that depends
upon its parts, then taking care of only one of its parts,
namely human civilization, will not result in its peace. Now,
as said above, the idea of temporal peace being the highest
goal for human beings cannot be reconciled with
Augustine’s original understanding of rightly ordered love
wherein God is precisely the ultimate goal. However, as also
mentioned above, when it comes to “purely human living,”
Augustine does consider temporal peace to be the primary
goal. Now a worldview for sustainability is arguably one that
is confined to this purely human living since it does not
concern itself with the supernatural or other-worldly ends
that human beings might have. Therefore, it would not seem
inappropriate to posit temporal peace as the highest goal for
this worldview.
Thus, in my sketch of a worldview for sustainability,
temporal peace, understood as the goal of maintaining the
integrity of the earth’s biosphere, would serve as the highest
goal. And as long as we precisely keep in mind the
qualification that this worldview is only concerned with the
purely human life, then even those who believe in a greater
goal for human beings beyond this life should generally not
find anything objectionable with such a worldview—much
like Augustine himself, who saw no incongruence between
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striving for temporal peace on the one hand, and loving
God above all things on the other.
What then would be the more specific implications of this
worldview? For one, such a worldview would entail that the
desire that people have for creatures, whether plants,
animals, or fellow human beings, should ultimately be
referred back to their love of the continuous existence and
“peace” of the biosphere. In other words, people’s love for
other creatures and even for themselves should not threaten
to disturb or damage the biosphere as a whole. To give a
concrete example, let us say that I am walking through a
nature reserve and am currently enjoying what I am
experiencing. As I take pleasure in the pleasant milieu, I am
careful not to litter carelessly even though it might be more
convenient for me to just throw my trash in some obscure
place in the park than finding a garbage bin which might be
far off. And this is because I have the desire not simply to
enjoy the nature reserve but to preserve it because it is
ultimately part of the biosphere. Moreover, I am aware that,
in taking care of the biosphere through this action of
maintaining the cleanliness of the nature reserve, I would
also ultimately contribute to the general well-being of all
living creatures in the planet.
Now perhaps a less easy example is when it comes to
consuming animals or plants. It might not be that selfevident as to how a person still primarily values preserving
the biosphere if he is engaging in the activity of eating other
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life forms. Nevertheless, I also believe that desiring the good
of the biosphere is possible even when one is consuming
plants and animals. As said above, Augustine believed that
the peace of animals is in their continuing survival and
propagation. If that is the case, then as long as a person is
careful that she is not consuming animals in such a way that
she is contributing to drastic reduction of their species, then
she can still consume or use such animals without going
against temporal peace. The same principle can be applied to
plant species, and I believe even to the inanimate physical
world. Inanimate resources of nature, such as water, should
be used but not to the point of reducing the amount in a
manner that proves detrimental to the environment. To be
sure though, the worldview that I am sketching out will still
follow Augustine’s belief that humans are the most valuable
of earthly creatures. Considering the preservation of the
biosphere as the highest goal does not mean compromising
human worth, but it simply means that human beings
should not love themselves to the point that they are
endangering the totality of beings on the earth by
substantially reducing or even extinguishing species of living
beings. It is this excessive destruction of species and natural
resources that is more likely the effect of disordered love
and the disturber of the biosphere’s order.
Perhaps borrowing from Augustine’s metaphor of the
body would help clarify my point more. It is no great harm
for the human body to lose certain parts such as hair, nails,
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skin, or baby teeth. The reason for this is because these
parts grow back anyway, and sometimes it is even in line
with the body’s natural growth for these parts to be
removed. What is however often considered a substantial
harm to the body is that if it loses a part which cannot grow
back, and if such loss is not part of its natural growth; for
example, if a certain limb is maimed. It is arguably this kind
of loss which Augustine considers as that which mars the
general beauty of the body. Applying this metaphor to the
biosphere, it might be said that it is no great harm to the
biosphere if certain life forms are consumed as long as the
rate of consumption is such that it allows the regeneration
of the species of these life forms. Moreover, it is part of the
nature of the biosphere that life forms consume each other.
However, the consumption of living creatures at a rate
which does not allow them to regenerate their population,
and thus a consumption that can be generally considered
unnatural, can be understood as that which truly mars the
beauty and peace of the biosphere.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to show how the
resources of Saint Augustine’s philosophy can serve as
material for sketching a basic worldview that can promote
sustainable living, which in turn is urgently needed in these
times. In doing this, I hope not only to point out the
perennial value of the Saint’s thought, but also the
possibility for those who work for sustainable development
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to look for resources in the wisdom of past thinkers who
may initially seem remote to their concerns. It might just be
these thinkers who have the answers to what they are
looking for.

Bibliography
Atkins, E.M., and Robert Dodaro, eds. Augustine: Political Writings.
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Benzoni, Francisco. “An Augustinian Understanding of Love in
an Ecological Context” Quodlibet Journal 6, no. 3 (2004).
http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/benzoni-love.shtml.
Burt, Donald. Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical
Philosophy. Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1999.
Caputo, John. Truth: Philosophy in Transit. London: Penguin Books,
2013.
De Witt, Annick Hedlund. “Rethinking Sustainable Development:
Considering How Different Worldviews Envision ‘Development’
and ‘Quality of Life’” Sustainability 6. (2014): 8310–8328. doi:
10.3390/su6118310.
Gadotti, Moacir. “Education for Sustainable Development: What
We Need to Learn to Save the Planet.” Brazil: Instituto Paulo
Freire, 2004. Last modified 2016. http://earthcharter.org/
virtual-library2/education-for-sustainable-development-whatwe-need-to-learn-to-save-the-planet-2004/.
Imran, Sophia, Alam, Korshed, and Narelle Beaumont.
“Reinterpreting the Definition of Sustainable Development for

98

JOSEPH EMMANUEL D. STA. MARIA

a More Ecocentric Reorientation” Sustainable Development 22
(2014): 134–144. doi:10.1002/sd.537.
Kaufman, Gordon D. “Ecological Consciousness and the
Symbol ‘God’.” Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000): 3–22.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1390316.
Lawless, George. “Augustine’s Decentering of Asceticism.” In
Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, edited
by Robert Dodaro and George Lawless, 141–162. New York:
Routledge, 2000.
Ledoux, Arthur A. “A Green Augustine: On Learning to Love
Nature Well.” Theology and Science 3, no. 3 (2005): 331–343.
doi:10.1080/14746700500317313.
Mann, William E. “Augustine on evil and original sin.” In Cambridge
Companion to Augustine, edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann, 40–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001.
Pappas, Jesse and Eric Pappas. “The Sustainable Personality:
Values and Behaviors in Individual Sustainability.” International
Journal of Higher Education. 4, no.1 (2015): 12–21. doi:
10.5430/ijhe.v4n1p12.
Ranke-Heinemann, Uta. Women, Sexuality and the Catholic Church.
Translated by Peter Heinegg. New York: Doubleday, 1990.
Reid, Alan. “Exploring Values in Sustainable Development.” Teaching
Geography 21, no. 4 (1996): 168–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/
23754452.
Ryan, Alan. On Politics. London: Penguin Books, 2012.
Saint Augustine. City of God. Translated by Walsh, Gerald G., Zema,
Demetrius B., Monahan, Grace, and Daniel J. Honan. Edited by
Vernon J. Bourke. New York: Image Books Doubleday, 1958.
Saint Augustine. City of God. Translated by Marcus Dods from
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2. Edited by
Philip Schaff. New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co,

Budhi XXII.3 (2018): 57–99.

99

1887. Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight.
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1201.htm.
Saint Augustine. The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Translated by John
K. Ryan. New York: Doubleday, 1960.
Saint Augustine. The Happy Life; Answer to Skeptics; Divine Providence
and the Problem of Evil; Soliloquies. Translated by Robert P. Russell
et al.vol. 5 of The Fathers of the Church, New York: Catholic
University of America Press, 2008.
Saint Augustine. Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and On the
Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book. Translated by
Ronald J. Teske. vol. 84 of The Fathers of the Church, New York:
Catholic University of America Press, 1991.
TeSelle, Eugene. “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of
Genesis I, 1-5” Recherches Augustiniennes 5 (1968): 95–137.
Woo, B. Hoon. “Pilgrim’s Progress in Society: Augustine’s Political
Thought in The City of God.” Political Theology 16, no. 5 (2015)
421–441. doi:10.1179/1462317X14Z.000000000113.

